

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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JULY 28, 1960
3:41 P.M.

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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 252, JULY 28, 7:00 P.M.

THERE ARE TWO MAJOR LINES OF THOUGHT AT LEAST WHICH EXPLAIN RECENT SOVIET BEHAVIOR. BOTH ARE BASED ON GENERAL PREMISE THAT LONG TERM POLICIES STILL REST ON SOVIET CALCULATION THEY CAN ACHIEVE WORLD AIMS THROUGH PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT. ONE IS LARGELY BASED ON CALCULATION THAT TEMPORARY PERIOD OF PRESSURE AND TENSION BOTH FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE IN ORDER PUT SOVIET UNION IN BETTER BARGAINING POSITION FOR FUTURE ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS AND HAS PARTIAL STRENGHT PROBING FUNCTION. OTHER BASED ON BELIEF THAT U-2 INCIDENT AND MISCALCULATION ABOUT PRESSURES ON US AT SUMMIT HAVE DAMAGED SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL POSTURE FROM MILITARY AND POLITICAL STANDPOINT, CAUSING SOVIET LEADERS FEEL OBLIGED MAKE ACTIVE EFFORT RESTORE BLOC POSTURE OF GLOBAL STRENGTH AS VITAL PARALLEL ELEMENT TO ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN QUEST FOR POLITICAL GAINS.

FIRST ALTERNATIVE PROBABLY MORE LIKELY. SOVIETS WERE COMING INTO SUMMIT WITH PRESSURES LARGELY AGAINST RATHER THAN FOR THEM. POLICY OF PERSONAL CONTACTS BETWEEN LEADERS AND TREND TOWARD IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS HAD NEITHER GIVEN PROMISE OF CONCESSIONS OR REVEALED SERIOUS SPLITS. ON OTHER HAND, CANNOT BE EXCLUDED THAT SOVIETS COULD NOT FULLY CONTROL HANDLING OF U-2 AND WERE THROWN OFF BALANCE BY US POLICY REGARDING IT. RB-47 SHOOTING SEEMS DIRECT RETALIATION FOR U-2, CALLED FOR BY MILITARY POSTURE REQUIREMENT.

EVEN THOUGH RELATIONS WITH US GOVERNMENT ITSELF NOW AT LOW EBB, SOVIET CLEARLY HOPE SUSTAIN MOMENTUM OF GREATER TIES



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-2- 252, JULY 28, 7:00 P.M., FROM MOSCOW.

AND CONTACTS WITH US AS WHOLE. HOW LONG SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO OR DESIRE TO RIDE ALONG WITH THIS CONTRADICTION IS UNCERTAIN. ON ONE HAND THEY INFER READINESS TO TAKE UP AGAIN WITH NEW PRESIDENT, ON OTHER HAND PURSUIT OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH US GOVERNMENT RESULTS IN CERTAIN INHIBITIONS AND DISADVANTAGES IN PURSUING OBJECTIVES ELSEWHERE. THEY WILL PROBABLY REAPPRAISE THEIR POSITION DURING NEXT FEW MONTHS.

CHICOM INFLUENCE MAY HAVE PLAYED ROLE IN DETERMINING CURRENT SOVIET BEHAVIOR. SOVIETS UNQUESTIONABLY HAVE INTEREST IN DEMONSTRATING SOLIDARITY WITH PEIPING. HOWEVER, CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTE SEEMS RULE OUT WHOLESALE SOVIET ADOPTION OF CHICOM APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH NON-BLOC COUNTRIES.

OF COURSE, DESIRE TO AVOID RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR IS UNDOUBTEDLY MAJOR FACTOR IN SOVIET CALCULATIONS AND LIMITATION ON EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIETS WILL PRESS ANY GIVEN COURSE. SIGNIFICANT THAT IN AREAS WHERE SOVIET ACTIONS LIKELY LEAD MORE DIRECTLY TO BLOC INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY CONFLICT WITH US, SUCH AS BERLIN AND TAIWAN, SOVIETS HAVE BEEN FAIRLY CAUTIOUS SINCE SUMMIT BREAKDOWN. BASIC SOVIET EFFORT DURING PRESENT PERIOD OF TENSION SEEMS DIRECTED AGAINST US OVERSEAS BASES, TOWARD SUPPORT OF SOVIET POSITION IN GERMANY; AS WELL AS ISOLATION OF "IMPERIALIST" US.

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